distinguished the French type was not only the single-minded purpose with which since the Revolution representatives of the French state (mostly notably republican school teachers) pursued the goal of turning provincials into 'Frenchmen', but also the genuine universalism in French nationalism, which sought not only to build the nation, but also to expand it so that it embraced as much of humanity as possible.
11
These differences of opinion raise important questions about the evolution of French national identity and nationalism. In the first place, as French power surged across Europe over the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, French soldiers and officials came across non-French peoples whom they struggled to understand or accommodate. If the rights of man were universal, it seemed that they were, in fact, buried beneath deep seams of cultural difference. Put another way, the universalist aspirations of the French Revolution were heavily blunted once they made contact with the 'other'. In the Holy Roman Empire, the variety of local customs and practices -and the obvious attachment to them which persisted amongst many Germans -bemused and frustrated the French as they sought to export revolutionary ideals and institutions.
Cultural difference was a still more urgent issue in those areas like Belgium, Piedmont and the Rhineland, which were directly annexed by the Republic. When these regions officially became part of France, the challenge of turning their peoples into French citizens seriously tested the revolutionaries' universalist ideas, since they constantly struck against a wall of much older loyalties, social relations and customs. As Stuart Woolf has shown, the 'universalism' of French revolutionary notions of nationhood was manners (moeurs), politeness (civilité) and laws (police -which also means organisation, administration). 12 Mike Broers has further proposed that the French exercised a 'cultural imperialism' or indeed an 'orientalism' within Europe, predicated on this sense of having the blueprint for a state arranged along lines citizenship exercised within a rational, ordered and centralized state.
13
The cultural process by which these French ideas of citizenship, nationhood and civilization developed did not start with the Revolution, but began, as David Bell has shown, at the beginning of the eighteenth century when, in opposition literature the 'nation' rather than the king started to be regarded as the source of legitimacy, particularly amongst the Jansenists. 14 Moreover, in what Peter Sahlins terms the 'citizenship revolution', from the 1760s the monarchy itself sought to make clearer distinctions between nationals and foreigners, while writers began to explore concepts of the active citizen participating in the public sphere. 15 Liah Greenfeld argues that the development of French nationalism in the eighteenth century was spurred by a sense of ressentiment towards France's great rival, Britain. This term did not only mean 'resentment', but also a more complex knot of envy for, reaction to and imitation of British mores and institutions, driven by a patriotic sense that France could and ought to do better. 16 civilization was never doubted -at least, not by revolutionary and Napoleonic officialsbut observations about the Germans were not entirely negative and in some cases they were quite the opposite. Even on the eve of their crushing defeat of the Prussians at Jena- institutions were good enough to be kept, some could be transplanted from one part of the Grand Duchy to another, while others had to be swept away altogether. Among the useful institutions which were even worth emulating elsewhere were the fire insurance company, which was cheap enough to be accessible to almost anyone, and the regime in the prisons, which ensured the humane treatment of the inmates, while also imposing on them useful tasks which instilled the work ethnic amongst criminals. 34 Yet there was less to be said for the formerly Bavarian areas of the new state. In the same month, Marshal
Murat, who was the first Grand Duke, thundered to Napoleon of the administration that 'it is a chaos which is giving me a great deal of trouble to disentangle. There has never been an organisation less regular than that which exists here. …. There was a royal regency council, a ducal regency council, a privy council, a commission … no one has fixed responsibilities … I cannot find anyone who is completely familiar with any single branch of the civil service'.
35
The differences across the Grand Duchy were still apparent in 1809, which was a very difficult year for the French in Germany. A report on the public mood in March declared that morale was generally good in the formerly Prussian areas, where the government had been enlightened. The County of 'Lamarck' 36 was a small province which had 'profited from all the good laws of Frederick II'. Yet even here, there were problems, for a Gordian knot of administrative and fiscal offices had been deliberately maintained to prevent the Prussian state from raising taxation. Needless to say, the local population now had cause to regret to arrival of 'a government which is too close and too 34 Voltaire, these nobles were obsessed with their status, particularly their honours and titles, but, the report continues, 'the regeneration of the country has begun with the decrees which suppress serfdom and feudal inheritance … it has changed slaves into men.
The brutishness of these slaves is such that they do not feel its benefits yet, but measures are being taken to hasten their education. Now there is a mass of people who have been rescued.' This comment was, of course, a little optimistic, not least because all peasants had to pay compensation to their lords for the abolition of seigneurialism. Since the costs were prohibitive for many peasants, the system remained unaltered in many parts of the Grand Duchy. The report concludes with a remark on state-building à la française:
… but it will surely require time and effort to create a patrie from these people gathered up from ten or twelve different jurisdictions and amongst whom, unlike on the other bank of the Rhine, there has occurred no revolution, which is a terrible, but very rapid, method of education for a people.
38
The overwhelming sense of all this is that the Germans would require an enormous dedication of time and effort before they could be cultivated to the levels of civilisation represented by the French Revolution. France had earned the right to lead the process precisely because it had had a revolution. It was regenerated. 
Germans into Frenchmen: the Rhineland
If the Germans were so different from the French, how could they be shaped into citizens, as they had to do when, from 1798, the French began to process of annexing the Rhineland? 39 In the 1790s, the obvious answer for the revolutionaries was an ideological one: the question was answered by the universalist implications of the rights of man.
From the French perspective, the full enjoyment of these rights could only occur within a
French republican framework, but sincere loyalty to that Republic and active engagement in citizenship were -in revolutionary theory -the essential determinants of nationality.
Initially, when annexation seemed very likely to go ahead, the French commissioners in the conquered territories of the Rhineland in the spring of 1798 spoke of their gratification over the apparent enthusiasm with which the Rhenish peoples petitioned for annexation. 40 Some officials even claimed that the Rhineland, like France, had had its own revolution, even if it was nipped in the bud by the Prussian resurgence in 1793-4. In a carefully-scripted festival held in March 1798, an official was to declare that 'the people of these territories had courageously thrown off the yoke of its tyrants, who coalesced in order to retake that sovereignty which had just been reconquered'. All of this suggested that the Rhinelanders did, indeed, have the political will to the part of the French Republic and that they, unlike much of the rest of Germany, had awoken to their 39 Among the best works on the French occupation and annexation of the Rhineland are T. The truths which are proclaimed there are eternal truths, independent of circumstance and place. The rights and duties of man are the same at Constantinople as they are at Paris. But if those rights are imprescriptible, the course of events can indefinitely suspend their application. They have often sold by corruption, they have often been forgotten by ignorance and fanaticism.
Sometimes, finally, the laws of war, which make one people dependent on another, deprive it momentarily of the exercise of its sovereignty. The inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine are in this last category. But the Republic is great enough to allow these people to know the full extent of their rights, as it is strong enough to maintain the practical measures which circumstances impose and which are necessary for its own conservation.
44
The practical application of Lambrechts' reply is perhaps not surprising in that, as one might expect, the occupiers were reluctant to open up any legal channels through which concerted opposition might be expressed. Yet it is also clear that Lambrechts and Rudler were unwilling to admit even to each other, in closed correspondence, that the rights of man did not necessarily apply to the Rhineland. Significantly, Rudler was from Alsace and Lambrechts was from Belgium: both men, in other words, were from the geographical and cultural peripheries of the French Republic. Both probably understood more than most that the revolutionary state not only had to undertake the administrative integration of the periphery through the imposition of uniform structures, but that it also had to encourage the cultural absorption of the peoples of the periphery. The doctrine of the rights of man, by transcending language, customs and other sources of ethnic identity, had the potential to integrate diverse peoples into one polity -once it was no longer deemed risky to give the peoples of the periphery the freedom to express themselves. Yet in the 1790s, that moment seemed long distant. The correspondence of the representatives of the French power on the ground is replete with remarks about the nostalgia for the old regime, the persistence of religiosity and -tellingly -language as a barrier to the forging of the Rhenish peoples into French citizens. 45 Although it was never explicitly whispered, there was an implicit recognition that, for all the cosmopolitanism implicit in the revolutionary ideal of citizenship, the universality of the rights of man was buried beneath weighty layers of cultural difference and the persistence of older social relations. In practice, the Rhinelanders would not be granted full 45 Among others, Casimir Rostan complained in early 1799 of the 'silent intrigues of the priests', who 'warn against our principles, and adroitly throw disfavour onto republican institutions: AN F/1e/42 (Mémoire sur la situation des esprits dans les 4 nouveau départemens de la rive gauche du Rhin, par Casimir Rostan, 13 Pluviôse an VII).
constitutional government until the Consulate of Napoleon Bonaparte, by which time the idea of active citizenship was all but an empty concept. To Napoleon, there was no need to shape the Rhenish into politically engaged citizens, since the role of all French subjects -a term which officially supplanted the word 'citizen' in 1806 -was primarily to obey, not participate in politics.
Yet the revolutionaries persisted in the belief that the Rhenish could be forged into citizens. One suspects that the French ultimately hoped to assimilate -that is,
following Mike Broers and the theorist Nathan Wachtel, 46 to obliterate the indigenous culture and impose the imperial one in its place. In pondering how to do so, some republicans came up with some radical solutions which dwelt on the issues of language and cultural identity. In February 1799 the naturalist and antiquarian Casimir Rostan, simply inherit the prejudices of the old regime. 48 None of these propsals were taken seriously at the time, but it shows that, for all the emphasis on citizenship as the determinant of nationality, in reality some of the revolutionaries believed that cultural uniformity was necessary. Under pressure the revolutionary proponents of 'civic' nationalism could adopt tenets more usually associated with the 'ethnic' kind.
Yet the reality on the ground proved to be very different -the Rhineland was never fully assimilated into the French imperium, but was rather integrated into it -that is, again following Broers and Wachtel, French institutions were imposed, but then the local population adapted them, which allowed for older mentalities, loyalties and cultural and social ties to remain intact, or at the very most mutated. The Rhineland was strategically too important and local society too vigorous for the French to risk alienating those whose co-operation or quiescence was needed. Lambrechts told Rudler at the start of his mission that he was not to strike indiscriminately at all customs, for fear of 48 AN F/1e/42 (Berger to the Directory, Mainz, n.d.).
alienating the population. 49 The republican festivals held in 1797 were bilingual. 50 While initially Rudler hoped that he could use only fully-paid-up Rhenish republicans to administer the French conquests, later officials, especially under Napoleon, recognized the importance of local knowledge and a grasp of the local dialect more than ideological conformity, as well as the importance of having the respect and trust of the population, even if this meant recruiting officials and jurists who had served the Old Regime. 51 This meant, in effect, that the French used intermediaries: local people who could to some extent mediate between the demands of the revolutionary or Napoleonic state and the local population. In some cases -as in Cologne and Dormagen -these intermediaries mounted a robust and, for a time, successful defence of local institutions against the leveling impulses of the French. This was a situation which the government in Paris found hard to swallow:
… it is evident that the unity which is so necessary in the administrative order and in any well-established political system, demands the reform of the government of Cologne. … It would be contradictory to establish our republican regime in all the other parts of that region, while only the city of Cologne keeps a form of Government entirely opposed to our own. 52 In fact, as Michael Rowe has shown, Rhenish officials, including those of Cologne, were not counter-revolutionaries, but, under pressure from both sides, were trying hard to steer a middle course between the French and their exiled German rulers. 53 Throughout the 'French period', the Rhinelanders proved to be not the passive subjects of the Napoleonic state, but rather they took what they wanted from the French -not least the Napoleonic
Code -while working to mitigate the impact of other aspects of French rule.
54
For the French revolutionaries, it was clear that while the Germans were, by and large, a frustratingly complex people whose loyalties remained rooted in the past, there was still some good raw material with which officials could work as they reordered central
Europe. If one admitted that, then it also meant that one could potentially go a step further and suggest that Germany had never been as benighted as some French policy makers suggested. Germany therefore could be used -in a positive sense -as a means of chastising French action in Europe. In 1810, Germaine de Staël did just that when she tried to publish one of her greatest works, De l'Allemagne, which had a clear polemical objective in attacking Napoleon's policies. Before 1806, she writes:
Germany was an aristocratic federation; this empire had no common centre of enlightenment and public spirit; it did not form a compact nation, and the binding was missing from the bundle. Yet that same universalism (the term used at the time was cosmopolitisme) ensured that
French nationalism was also expansive: if political rights -and not culture -were the prime determinants of nationhood, then there were, potentially, no limits to the expansion of revolutionary France. This sense of purpose, based as it was on a sense of superiority, was later called the mission civilisatrice, or civilizing mission, which justified French overseas imperialism in the nineteenth century. Yet there was one important rupture between, on the one hand, French nationalism as an imperial ideology in Europe and, on the other, as visited upon the overseas empire of the nineteenth century. As the French imperium in Germany shows, in Europe it was hoped that French laws and administration would eventually be as applicable among the conquered peoples as they were in France, but this universalist premise was not extended to the indigenous populations of the overseas empire. While there were programmes for 'assimilation' and, after 1900, 'association' (which accepted limits on complete assimilation and a slower pace of francisation, or 'Frenchification'), in practice local peoples were legally 'subjects' and, as such, they did not bear anywhere near the same rights as citizens. 61 This suggests that, in the nineteenth century, a racial dimension to French identity did emerge. Yet in metropolitan France, nationalists continued to insist on the civic heritage bequeathed by the Revolution. 62 This republican inheritance remained -and remains still -a weighty
